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Abstract 
Over the last decade, there has been growing attention to the issue of neighbourhood 
governance and community participation in China. The focus has been on the extent to 
which community involvement in rule-making and decision-making processes could 
be promoted. The issue of community participation in urban redevelopment, however, 
has received little attention. Urban redevelopment in contemporary Chinese cities is 
taking place on an unprecedented scale, dissolving long-standing local communities 
and demolishing poverty-stricken neighbourhoods. Examining the case of Beijing, this 
paper questions current redevelopment planning and residents’ appeal procedures. It 
considers the extent to which local communities in dilapidated neighbourhoods have 
difficulty making an impact on decisions affecting their neighbourhoods’ 
redevelopment. The paper considers the extent to which local residents could express 
discontent and put forward ‘rightful claims’. The paper concludes that community 
participation in neighbourhood redevelopment remains at the bottom of the ladder of 
participation, and that the vested interests of local authorities and developers in urban 
redevelopment projects restrict poor residents’ active participation in decision-making 
processes.  
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Introduction 
In the Western literature, community participation in urban regeneration has emerged 
as one of the main policy issues during the last two decades. Although there is little 
hard evidence about the impact of community participation upon project outcomes, it 
has been accepted ‘good practice’ for the past 40 years in the West. Discussion 
focuses on how to effectively engage community representatives and local residents in 
project design and implementation (Ball, 2004; Burton, 2003). Increased attention to 
community views coincided with a newer emphasis on establishing local regeneration 
partnerships as a vehicle for area-based initiatives in tackling poverty and social 
exclusion (Geddes, 1997). Local communities are regarded as being “intended 
beneficiaries,” having “the greatest stake in the future of the area” and knowing “from 
experience the range of issues” that need to be tackled (Macfarlane, 1993 cited in 
Chanan, 2003: 17). In Britain, community participation was considered as “a way to 
speed processes and generate more acceptable proposals” (DoE, 1994: vi), but the 
concept has grown quickly to be regarded as a right in participatory democracy 
(DETR, 2000), and being “central to the process of empowerment and a necessary 
condition for overcoming social exclusion” (Wood, 2000: 20). At European Union 
level, “active citizenship” was put forward to promote “active cooperation of local 
residents in public schemes designed for the improvement of disadvantaged or 
underdeveloped localities” (Chanan, 1997: 5). 
 
In developing countries, community participation is largely associated with the 
emergence of development project partnership schemes as well as the implementation 
of participatory approach in urban and social development (Midgley, 1986). The 
concept of development partnership has evolved from a partnership between central 
and local governments to deliver services to partnership between governments and 
private capital, and to local partnerships to promote locally-driven initiatives which 
involves local communities (Southern, 2002: 18). The inclusion of local communities 
is advocated in various policy documents by international agencies. For instance, in 
1993, UN-Habitat stressed the importance of setting up multi-sectoral partnerships 
between the public sector, the private sector and the third sector (residents and their 
organisations) to establish roles that are “complementary and mutually-supportive” 
(UN-Habitat, 1993).The gradual empowerment of urban services users was 
recommended, and the public sector was given a role to create an enabling 
environment for users to accomplish this (Choguill, 1994). 
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In mainland China, the concept of ‘community’ has received increasing attention in 
policy discourse from the mid-1980s (Bray, 2006). This is closely associated with 
involving local communities in the provision of social welfare (e.g. Leung and Wong, 
1999; Liu, 2004; Wang, Yip, Zhang, Wang and Hsiao, 2005) and urban service 
delivery (Xu and Chow, 2006). Over the last decade, residents’ voluntary participation 
in community affairs has also been emphasized in line with the government promotion 
of ‘community building’. This could be described as an attempt to rationalize and 
modernize existing neighbourhood-based grassroots organizations (Bray, 2006). 
Community participation has also been at the core of experimental projects in rural 
development and poverty alleviation (e.g. Plummer and Taylor, 2004b). Recently, 
more critical literature has stressed the limits of community participation in policy-
making and implementation (Cai, 2004; Chu, 2004) and the changing nature of urban 
governance that re-invents local communities to create a “governable society” (Wu, 
2002a). 
 
Community participation has been rarely discussed, however, in the context of urban 
regeneration. Urban regeneration in contemporary Chinese cities entails complete 
demolition and redevelopment, displacing the majority of local residents and 
dissolving long-standing communities. Hence, urban regeneration in China can be 
largely equated with urban redevelopment. This places China’s experience of 
community participation in a different context to those of more industrial and post-
industrial cities of the West where debates are focus on their active involvement in 
changing the character of a continuing community. 
 
This paper critically examines the degree of local community participation in the 
urban redevelopment process. It argues that local residents are effectively barred from 
taking part in project designation and design, and there is little opportunity for them to 
express their discontent or secure ownership of any changes. The discussions in this 
paper draws on evidence from multiple sources – existing  literatures, governmental 
reports and policy documents, and in-depth interviews with local residents and 
officials. The majority of local residents interviewed were recruited from an inner city 
neighbourhood in Dongcheng district, Beijing. The neighbourhood’s redevelopment 
was phased in, and at the time of my field visits, its first phase was completed, 
replacing largely one-storey dilapidated public rental dwellings with high-rise 
commercial flats. Its second phase was yet to commence, and has not started as of 
March 2007. 
 
The rest of this paper is divided into five sections. It begins with a brief overview of 
the way in which community participation in China’s urban neighbourhoods is 
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understood. Second, it will examine urban neighbourhood transformation and its 
implication for the way in which local communities are shaped. The third section 
examines the way in which community participation in urban redevelopment is 
limited and faces constraints. The fourth section touches upon the notion of ‘rightful 
resistance’ (O’Brien, 1996) in urban redevelopment, and examines the extent to which 
local residents could express their discontent and put forward ‘rightful claims’. The 
final section sums up and concludes. 
 
1. Community participation in urban neighbourhoods 
The concept of community lacks a clear-cut definition. Policy documents often 
loosely define a community as a population in a given locality (for example, DETR, 
2000). Diverse social and economic circumstances within a given locality, however, 
indicate that a community is hard to define. Residents may belong to ‘multiple 
communities’ that may extend beyond a locality (Ball, 2004; Kearns and Parkinson, 
2001). In China, the term ‘community’, has a specific spatial definition for 
administrative purposes, territorially defined to include residential areas within the 
jurisdiction of an urban grassroots organization called residents’ committee (in 
Chinese, jumin weiyuanhui) (Bray, 2006: 534). [1] The main function of a residents’ 
committee is to facilitate government-community communication, maintain local 
public order and provide social service delivery (Mok, 1988). Until the 1990s, it had 
been a useful vehicle of welfare provision especially for those vulnerable groups who 
were left out of the employment-based social welfare system. Day-to-day operation of 
a residents’ committee relies heavily on a few salaried members (who are usually 
elderly retired women) and volunteers from local communities. A case study in 
                                              
[1]  It is necessary to note that the territorial definition of a community in urban China for 
administrative purposes does not diminish its diverse nature. Work-unit compounds and 
municipal housing estates built in the planned economy period were known to have 
homogeneous characteristics in their social composition. Residents, however, had different 
sets of interests and experiences based on their individual characteristics (e.g. educational 
attainment, positions in their work places, etc.), which led to differential access to community 
resources (Logan and Bian, 1993). The differing degree of housing space consumption among 
residents turned out to raise serious complaints especially when redevelopment compensation 
was monetarised in 1998 (Shin, 2007b). Although residents could be divided into ‘multiple 
communities’ based on individual engagement in various activities within and beyond a 
locality, they are be treated as ‘a community’ based on the fact that there is no distinction in 
the way they are treated in urban redevelopment processes. 
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Guangzhou suggested that about 4 per cent of local residents voluntarily undertook 
activities organised by residents’ committees (Chan, 1993: 180). With the assistance 
of residents’ committees, local authorities as well as local branches of the Communist 
Party often launch collective neighbourhood mobilization programs that range from 
free consultation with professionals to moral education. These may “facilitate the 
cultivation of a sense of neighborliness” by bringing communities together, but they 
place “strong moral sanctions of collective participation” with less respect to 
individual privacy (ibid, 212). Community participation in neighbourhood affairs is 
therefore largely associated with residents’ participation in state organized space. This 
poses problems for the promotion of community participation in a western sense. It is 
cited as one of the main obstacles to carrying through poverty alleviation programs in 
rural China. As Janelle Plummer argues: “for many Chinese farmers the idea of 
working together is associated with the days of the collective economy” (Plummer, 
2004: 9). During the planned economy era, most urban residents were also mobilized 
through their work place, which became the main locus of citizens’ participation in 
urban political, social and economic affairs (Lü and Perry, 1997). In return, they were 
“promised an egalitarian, redistributive order that provided job security, basic living 
standards, and social opportunities for those from disadvantaged backgrounds” (Tang 
and Parish, 2000: 1). 
 
Over the last decade, there has been increasing attention to the way in which urban 
communities engage and become part of a new form of neighbourhood governance 
(for instance, Bray, 2006; He, 2003; Zhang, 2003). This reflects the emphasis given by 
China’s central and local governments to reconfiguring residents’ committees around 
the concept of ‘community building’ (or shequ jianshe in Chinese). [2] The promotion 
of this new form of neighbourhood governance is interpreted as having dual objectives 
(Bray, 2006): (1) more comprehensive delivery of social services to meet the diverse 
needs of local residents; (2) institutional change to achieve greater political and social 
integration. Some see it as having resulted from “compromises between community 
development and urban control” (Jones and Xu, 2002: 114). One interesting initiative 
is the direct election of residents’ representatives. A residents’ committee was usually 
staffed mostly by elderly volunteers (usually retired women) appointed by local 
authorities. The new ‘community building’, relies on employing professional 
community workers (or shequ cadres), who are younger and come from a trade-union 
                                              
[2]  The implementation of ‘community building’ was officially endorsed by the announcement of 
the ‘Opinion of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on promoting community building nationwide’ 
in December 2000 (for the review of the development of ‘community building’ program, see 
Kojima and Kokubun, 2002). 
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or the Communist Party background. These cadres are to represent the interests of 
residents and mediate their relationship with local bureaucrats. To encourage 
residents’ participation in this new urban governance arrangement, these cadres are 
selected by direct election. From 1998, the direct election of residents’ representatives 
has spread to many cities, mostly located in coastal provinces (Trott, 2006). Some 
critics welcome these changes in neighbourhood governance, as they have “the 
potential for further autonomy” (Jones and Xu, 2002) and may open up space for 
residents’ democratic participation in decision-making processes (He, 2003). 
 
Indeed, other new organizations have emerged, enjoying a greater degree of 
independence and creating “possibilities for increased participation by Chinese people 
in decisions affecting their daily lives” (Taylor, 2004: 26). These social organizations 
include traditional ones such as the Women’s Federation that has adapted to the 
changing environment and expanded its local coverage. They also include private 
enterprise associations, specialist organizations (in areas such as trade and commerce) 
and welfare associations, all of which enjoy “greater involvement in decision-making 
within their respective areas” (Taylor, 2004: 26). It is argued that the emergence of 
these organisations constitutes important progress towards involving people in 
decisions at the local level that affect their lives. These social organisations are 
increasingly employing “strategies of negotiation and circumvention” to influence 
policy making and implementation (Saich, 2000). 
 
However, they take place within a context of strong social control by the state. Despite 
the voluntary participation of active residents in community affairs, getting involved 
in decision-making is still an uneasy affair for most urban residents. Public 
participation is not readily discussed in public discourse, and its promotion in 
regulatory, decision-making and rulemaking processes is still at its infancy (Wang, X., 
2003). One example is the previously cited direct election to select shequ cadres. In 
most cases, candidates are ‘nominated’ by party officials, endorsed by indirect 
election in which only heads of families or residents’ representatives cast their votes 
(Trott, 2006). ‘Community building’ as a new means of building a self-managed 
grassroots organization in contemporary Chinese cities cannot be separated from the 
administrative hierarchy and from the influence of the Communist Party. This erodes 
the very foundation of shequ offices as self-governing autonomous entities (Kojima 
and Kokubun, 2002). 
 
So far, we have examined the notion of community participation in Chinese contexts, 
and the emergence of a new form of neighbourhood governance in recent years. It is 
shown that community participation in urban China is largely associated with local 
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residents’ involvement in collective activities, and that the promotion of ‘community 
building’ as a self-managed grassroots activity cannot be separated from the state’s 
determination to maintain social control. Before examining the limits and constraints 
of community participation in urban redevelopment processes, the following section 
examines the impact of ‘neighbourhood transformation’ in the reform era on the way 
in which local communities are shaped. It will show that urban redevelopment largely 
targets dilapidated neighbourhoods that contain less mobile and poorer residents who 
have been excluded from sharing the benefits of reform. 
 
2. Neighbourhood transformation and local communities 
In the process of building a socialist China after her foundation in 1949, China 
followed in the footsteps of other socialist countries in Eastern Europe in re-creating 
its urban neighbourhoods. From 1949, the idea of communal living became the basis 
of a socialist society, leading to the adaptation of ‘micro-districts’. The policy aimed 
at constructing “a self-contained community of residential quarters, including 
dormitories, communal eating and recreation places, crèches, kindergartens, schools 
and local medical facilities, shopping and other service provision” (French and 
Hamilton, 1979: 9-11). This principle expanded to such an extent that “most urban 
residents would rarely have any need to travel beyond the walls of their work-and-
living unit” (Gaubatz, 1999: 1497). State enterprises were the major entities that 
supplied such facilities as part of in-kind welfare provision for their employees. 
Municipal housing bureaus provided and managed rental accommodation for those 
registered urban residents whose work-units were not rich enough to do so. Therefore, 
local communities were by and large tightly knit by their proximate relationships in 
both their work places and residential compounds. 
 
In this regard, residential mobility was very low for many decades until before the 
recent Open Door and Reform policies. Provincial or inter-urban migration was 
subject to strict control through the enforcement of the household registration system 
(or hukou in Chinese terms) which tied welfare benefits and employment to an 
individual’s original place of residence (Chan, 1994; Solinger, 1999).Movement 
within cities was less restricted, but the self-reliant residential compounds and 
restricted urban growth without suburbanization led to limited movement even within 
cities. Residential relocation was largely influenced by supply-side constraints (Wu, 
2004b: 456). Individual housing needs resulting from job transfers or family change 
(for example, childbirth or ageing parents) were brought forward to residents’ work-
units or municipal housing management bureau for determination, if any relocation 
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was requested. Households residing in rental dwellings provided by their work-units 
or municipal housing bureaus were not able to move freely. Any moves were 
determined, or negotiated at the most, by their work-units according to pre-set criteria. 
 
When cities slowly woke up to the implications of the reform era in the 1980s, 
changes to inner city neighbourhoods were still ‘organic’. Urban redevelopment was a 
piecemeal process, involving re-housing of local residents (Wu, 1999). This meant 
that local communities remained largely intact in terms of social composition. Since 
the mid-1990s, however, this ‘organic’ process has given its way to large scale real 
estate development that has involved mass clearance and reconstruction of long-
standing inner city neighbourhoods with residents’ permanent dispersion to new 
estates in suburban districts (Fang and Zhang, 2003; Zhang and Fang, 2003). The 
profit-led nature of inner city redevelopment has been strengthened by urban land 
reform (Zhang, 1997) and commercialization of urban housing (Wang and Murie, 
1996). Big variations in rents and the value of land make urban neighbourhoods in 
strategic locations prone to takeover by real estate capital (Wu, 2002b). 
 
In (post-) industrial capitalist cities, contemporary urban policies have entailed a more 
inclusive approach towards regeneration partnerships, moving “from a narrow 
preoccupation with physical regeneration to a wider concern with the economic and 
social regeneration of communities” (Geddes, 1997: 7). This has not been the pattern 
in China’s urban redevelopment policy. Since the mid-1990s, urban regeneration in 
China has been dominated by property-led redevelopment (He and Wu, 2005). In 
Beijing, for instance, with the arrival of new redevelopment policies that reflected the 
‘entrepreneurial’ characteristic of the local state, nearly one quarter of local residents 
in Dongcheng district (one of Beijing’s four inner city districts) were found to have 
been affected by urban redevelopment projects between 2000 and 2005 (Shin, 2007a). 
 
Subsequently, the spatial and social changes in urban China during the reform era 
have brought significant changes to the way in which local communities have been 
shaped. In comparison with the pre-reform practices, urban residents are now 
increasingly mobile, seeking upward mobility in their housing ladder to become 
homeowners. This suggests that residents are increasingly associated not on the basis 
of their employment status (as was the case in work-unit based residential compounds) 
but on the basis of their capacity to buy property. Under market conditions, they begin 
to behave as active consumers of commodified housing and meet their individual 
housing needs with their significantly increased financial means. Recent empirical 
studies testify to such behaviour (Li, 2000; Wang and Li, 2004; Wu, 2004a). 
Homeowners are increasingly organized through the formation of homeowners’ 
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committee (called yezhu weiyuanhui in Chinese), exercising their property rights to 
intervene in the way their properties are managed and neighbourhood affairs are 
decided (Read, 2003). This inevitably brings conflicts with other neighbourhood-
based organisations such as residents’ committees and property management offices 
(Zhang, 2003). 
 
Unlike the newly constructed residential estates, old dilapidated neighbourhoods in 
inner city districts and on the urban fringe are characterized by poverty concentration. 
Liu and Wu (2006) note that better-off and well-connected households have escaped 
from these neighbourhoods to become homeowners elsewhere, and rented out their 
rental dwellings to migrants. The result has been poverty concentration in 
communities that are “economically and physically marginalized” (Wang, Y.P., 2003: 
259). Poor residents have become less mobile, confined within these poverty-stricken 
neighbourhoods in increasingly fragmented cities (ibid). They have failed to benefit 
from housing privatization and commodification, many living on means-tested social 
assistance programs (Liu and Wu, 2006). They are the ones who have become largely 
subject to profit-led redevelopment. The limits and constraints of community 
participation in the following section are associated with these residents. 
 
3. Community participation in urban redevelopment: limits and 
constraints 
This section explains the ways in which urban redevelopment projects have been 
implemented to minimize local residents’ resistance and contain their discontents and 
frustration. These measures seek to maintain social stability and the swift 
implementation of urban neighbourhood transformation, which work in favour of 
development partnerships between local authorities and developers. Three issues are 
addressed: (1) limited participation in project design and implementation; (2) 
constraints upon residents in legal disputes; (3) lack of communication with local 
authorities. 
 
Limited participation in project design and implementation 
A European Commission report defines community participation in urban 
regeneration as “the active participation of local inhabitants in schemes to regenerate 
disadvantaged or declining areas” (European Commission, 1997: 19). This indicates 
that community participation includes various forms of involvement that ranges from 
consultation to actual participation of community representatives in project design, 
implementation and evaluation. Some draw a distinction between residents’ 
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participation in general community activities (horizontal involvement) and the 
participation of community leaders and representatives in decision-making (vertical 
involvement) (Chanan, 1997; DETR, 2000). It is generally acknowledged that the two 
forms of participation are closely related, and complement each other where local 
communities are successfully involved in neighbourhood improvement projects. 
 
We have seen that community participation in China’s urban neighbourhoods entails 
residents’ participation in grassroots activities organized by residents’ committees. 
This indicates, to some extent, the presence of ‘horizontal involvement’, but the nature 
of residents’ day-to-day associations differs considerably. Do residents in China 
engage in ‘vertical involvement’ in the process of neighbourhood transformation 
through redevelopment projects? When a neighbourhood is subjected to a 
redevelopment project, residents are expected to ‘participate’ actively in a model that 
promotes, in principle, multi-sectoral partnerships between the government, real estate 
developers and local residents. For instance, in a pilot redevelopment project in a 
neighbourhood called Haiyuncang, the official description stated that the 
redevelopment of Haiyuncang neighbourhood was carried out according to a new 
model in which the government was to organize activities, enterprises implement and 
residents participate. In practice, it is the partnership between local authorities and 
developers that is the key to the success of a redevelopment project. 
 
The critical role of the partnership between local authorities and developers is 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. This figure sums up a typical implementation process of 
a redevelopment project, and is based on a government recommended procedure 
announced in June 1994. This notice carried an important weight in the history of 
urban redevelopment in Beijing, as the four inner city district governments of Beijing 
were given planning power and autonomy to authorize redevelopment projects within 
their jurisdiction (Beijing Municipal Government, 1994a; Fang and Zhang, 2003: 
155). 
 
As shown in the figure, local authorities hold the right to designate a project area. In 
principle, each district government’s urban renewal office carries out feasibility 
studies, which becomes the basis of neighbourhood designation as a redevelopment 
project area. In practice, developers often approach urban renewal offices with an 
application to initiate redevelopment in a neighbourhood of their choice. The 
application is then considered by the urban renewal office, and is approved if it meets 
planning criteria. Once developers obtain planning permission to carry out a 
redevelopment project, they embark on producing a project design plan that includes 
plans for site clearance and local residents’ displacement and relocation. This plan 
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requires government approval (Beijing Municipal Government, 2001: Article 9). 
When this plan is approved by the district government, a public announcement needs 
to be made, which includes the names of the developers, the demolition area, the 
demolition schedule and the compensation details (ibid, Article 10). The local 
authority and developers also carry out publicity works so that residents are informed 
of the imminent redevelopment project and their displacement. This is also the 
moment when local authorities organize a residents’ assembly to ‘demonstrate their 
support for the program’. Residents’ committees and volunteers in grassroots 
activities are often mobilized to attend such meetings. 
 
Figure 1: Urban redevelopment process in Chinese cities 
 
Project designation
Project design
Signing an agreement between 
developer and district renewal office
Developer’s preparation of project 
design plan, including residents’
displacement and relocation plan
Residents’ displacement and 
relocation begins
Construction begins
Developer makes application for 
project designation
Cancellation of the project by 
district renewal office
Project implementation
(demolition and construction)
(if no work is carried out within 
a certain number of years)
District renewal office examines and 
approves the project design plan
District renewal office examines and 
approves the project
District renewal office reports 
the project approval to municipal 
renewal office
 
 
China’s urban planning during the planned era was noted for its lack of provision for 
public participation (Yeh and Wu, 1999). This legacy continues to live on in the 
reform era. As seen above, the redevelopment process explicitly prohibits residents 
from participating in project designation and design processes. Local authorities and 
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developers make important decisions at the early stage of a redevelopment project, 
and residents are invited to participate only at the implementation stage. There is no 
legal process like public hearing or public voting to hear residents’ voices or obtain 
their consent before designating a neighbourhood as a redevelopment project area. 
 
Constraints upon residents in legal disputes 
The absence of opportunities for residents to intervene in project designation and 
design reinforces their weak position when they face negotiation over compensation 
upon their displacement. As shown earlier in Figure 1, residents come in only at the 
stage of project implementation when most crucial decisions have been already made. 
Although residents are invited to make complaints and even appeal to the court, these 
procedures hardly favour residents. 
 
The national regulation on the management of demolition and relocation processes 
first appeared in March 1991 (State Council of China, 1991). Its major revision was 
made in 2001. In Beijing, when demolition is announced, local residents and 
developers are required to negotiate and come to an agreement on the level of 
compensation (Beijing Municipal Government, 2001: Article 12). If no agreement is 
reached, they then refer the matter to arbitration by the district government (ibid, 
Article 15). Figure 2 below shows the negotiation and arbitration process. 
 
The flaw in this process is that it is the same local government agency that grants 
initial planning permission to developers to carry out redevelopment projects. It is 
therefore very unlikely that the local government would arbitrate in a way that might 
hinder the progress of urban redevelopment. If residents refrain from accepting the 
local government’s arbitration decision, they can take the case to the people’s court 
(Beijing Municipal Government, 2001: Article 15). Experience shows that residents 
rarely win cases against developers (Fang, 1999; Johnson, 2004). 
 
If residents refrain from vacating their dwellings without legitimate reasons, local 
authorities also hold the right to instruct relevant bureaus to proceed with forced 
eviction, or obtain court orders to do so (Beijing Municipal Government, 2001: Article 
16). Developers and demolition companies possess the right to proceed with 
demolition if they can prove that they have fulfilled their legal responsibilities of 
providing residents with cash compensation or relocation dwellings. In such a case, 
the residents’ further appeal to the people’s court would not prevent developers from 
demolishing their homes. 
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Figure 1: The process of negotiation over compensation in Beijing’s urban 
redevelopment 
 
Negotiation between developers 
and residents begins over 
compensation
Authentication by a public notary
Demolition
Construction
Developer makes application for 
demolition and relocation
Government actions in place 
to freeze changes in 
household registration, 
tenure and dwelling structure
Vacation of dwellings by 
residents
District government examines 
and approves the application
District government makes a 
public announcement of the 
demolition
(If agreed)
Residents’ appeal to the local 
authority that approved the 
demolition
(If not agreed)
Residents’ appeal to the people’s 
court
(If agreed)
Local authority’s arbitration 
decision
(If not 
agreed)
Final court decision
Developers hold the right to 
proceed with demolition before 
final court decision is made
(If relocation 
dwellings are ready)
 
 
Residents resisting or appealing against demolition also experience difficulties due to 
tight demolition and relocation schedules imposed upon them. It is not uncommon to 
find residents being forced to vacate within weeks of receiving demolition notice. 
During this short period, they are required to come to an agreement on the level of 
compensation, find a temporary or permanent relocation dwelling and make all the 
arrangement for house-moving from a neighbourhood they have lived for decades. 
When part of a neighbourhood called Xinzhongjie in Dongcheng district was subject 
to demolition in December 1999 to make way for a luxurious commercial high-rise 
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estate, residents testified in the interviews with the author that they were allowed only 
three weeks to vacate their dwellings.  
 
Residents receive incentive payments if they move house in good time (ibid, Article 
32). Incentive payments are also given if they move out of inner city districts. This has 
been a common practice since the early 1990s (Beijing Municipal Government, 
1994b). The author’s interviews indicated that the scale of such incentive payments 
was quite substantial, reaching 9%~12% of their total cash compensation. The tight 
schedule of residents’ displacement from their dwellings places a huge amount of 
stress and anxiety on residents, especially if vacating their house involves no definite 
prospect of re-housing. 
People received the [redevelopment compensation] offer, pulled in cars 
for viewing. Just took that offer…At that time, our displacement was 
really bustling…Everyday, got in a car, went to see houses…our house-
moving was made really hastily. From 16 April to 6 May. Twenty days 
to find a house and move out. My goodness… 
(66-year-old female resident, moved to an outer suburban estate) 
 
Lack of communication with local authorities 
Local authorities are involved in every stage of a redevelopment project from project 
designation to project implementation. They remain, however, as an official mediator 
when disputes arise over the method and level of compensation. Local authorities may 
sympathize with the fate of residents facing displacement, but it is often the case that 
they maintain a ‘non-interventionist’ policy to remain impartial. An official explains: 
[Residents] might refrain from moving out. Then, the demolition 
company just has to get in touch with the family and resolve the 
situation…In the end, the only way out for them is to negotiate with the 
demolition company to see if there’s any other means to supplement 
compensation. From the viewpoint of the government, however, we 
cannot speak out, because we have to guarantee impartiality of our 
policy implementation. It has to be equal for everyone…  
(Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department, 
Dongcheng district government) 
 
Remaining impartial may be a recommended virtue of local authorities mediating 
disputes between conflicting interests, but when residents are endowed with 
substantially lower resources and poorer legal knowledge, supporting neither residents 
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nor developers acts in favour of developers. This influences the way in which 
residents obtain redevelopment-related information. The in-depth interviews with 
residents facing redevelopment suggest that they feel more comfortable with 
discussing the issues with residents’ committee leaders who they come in contact on a 
daily basis, but there is evidently lack of communication between residents and local 
authorities. Table 1 below summarizes the channel of obtaining redevelopment-related 
information by local residents based on the authors’ interviews. 
 
Table 1: Channels of obtaining redevelopment-related information  
 
Interviewee 
description 
Have you 
asked the 
local 
authority? 
Have you 
asked the 
neighbourhood 
committee 
leader? 
Have you 
discussed with 
your 
neighbours? 
Have you 
tried to get 
information 
on your own? 
51-year-old 
female 
No Not available Yes Yes 
44-year-old 
female 
No Yes Yes Yes 
54-year-old 
female 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
75-year-old 
female 
No No No Not available 
44-year-old 
female 
Not available Yes Not available Yes 
43-year-old 
female 
No Yes Yes Yes 
70-year-old 
male 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
47-year-old 
female 
Not available Yes Yes Yes 
57-year-old 
female 
No Yes Yes Yes 
          
Yes 2 7 7 8 
No 5 1 1 0 
Not available 2 1 1 1 
 
Residents’ committee leaders are usually the first point of contact for local residents, 
as they act as mediators between local residents and the local authority. Residents’ 
committee leaders take a visible role when it comes to neighbourhood redevelopment, 
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as they usually accompany developers when carrying out a household survey that 
forms the basis of calculating redevelopment compensation costs. This is because 
residents’ committee leaders are in principle best acquainted with the lives of local 
residents. 
 
The previous table also suggests that local residents are reluctant to ask their local 
authority. Only one interviewee out of nine mentioned that she had gone to the 
municipal housing bureau to find out more information about the new compensation 
policy. Other interviewees did not consider making a direct enquiry to the local 
authority, in particular, the Street Office that was primarily responsible for the 
administration of the redevelopment project in their neighbourhood. 
 
In fact, the author’s interviews with some residents who were subject to 
neighbourhood redevelopment in the near future expressed strong criticisms of 
developers and, to some extent, local officials. These strong criticisms were due to 
their antipathy towards profit-oriented commercial redevelopment. Some of the 
criticisms included: 
 
Ask who? The demolition squad doesn’t explain that to you. The Street 
Office just says it’s going to be the end of the year. The Street Office 
doesn’t tell the true story to us ordinary people…The Street Office 
should have told us about whether or not the demolition would take 
place. Take a note of this clearly. At the moment, everyone has a lot of 
complaints on this matter… Previously, the Street Office was the 
poorest work unit. Now, it’s become the richest 
(70-year-old male resident, facing redevelopment and displacement) 
 
This Street Office, what a despicable being it is. If you don’t believe 
this, then do a survey, and everyone will swear at the Street Office. I’ll 
tell you about them. They think of taking advantage of 
residents…Talking about the Street Office, [they are] just wicked…It 
always thinks of making money…those dregs of society, caring for the 
people? Who would believe that?  
(57-year-old female resident, facing redevelopment and displacement) 
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4. Seeking ‘rightful claims’ in urban redevelopment 
Urban redevelopment began to intensify from the early 1990s. In Beijing, a new 
redevelopment policy, which depended heavily on developers’ finance, came into 
existence in 1990, just one year after the violent oppression of democratic movement 
in 1989. While pursuing market-oriented reform policies to achieve sustained 
economic growth, government officials and the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter 
CCP) were particularly concerned to maintain socio-political order and stability 
through authoritarian rule (Chen, 1997; Lau, 2001). Urban redevelopment projects 
were largely targeted on inner city neighbourhoods. Poor residents were excluded 
from sharing the benefits of housing privatization and homeownership. Clearance and 
redevelopment, the main redevelopment strategy since the 1990s, was accompanied 
by large-scale displacement. Since the mid-1990s, as the urban redevelopment 
intensified, there were intermittent reports of bulldozing against the will of local 
residents, some of whom began to seek ways to exercise their ‘right to stay’ against 
what they saw as organized oppression by local government and professional 
developers. Since the residents’ degree of involvement in redevelopment is limited to 
the early stage of project implementation (that is, negotiation over compensation and 
displacement), the incidents of resistance mostly occur in relation to their 
displacement and the demolition of their dwellings. 
 
Kevin O’Brien’s prominent article on ‘rightful resistance’ in China points to a new 
phase in participation. He reports on an increasing popular struggle in China to 
establish ‘rightful claims’ using the language of the ‘authorities and established 
values’ (O’Brien, 1996). Rightful resistance refers to “a form of popular contention 
that (1) operates near the boundary of an authorized channel, (2) employs the rhetoric 
and commitments of the powerful to curb political or economic power, and (3) hinges 
on locating and exploiting divisions among the powerful” (ibid, 33). In order for this 
rightful resistance to take place, resisters need to “become aware that they have been 
granted certain protections”, and then “craft effective legal tactics, mobilize followers, 
and win a measure of sufferance, even support, for their contention” using “the 
vocabulary of the regime to advance their claims” (ibid, 35). The reform of legal 
systems in recent years provides a useful platform on which residents facing 
redevelopment and displacement could exercise their right to resist within the existing 
legal framework. Law suits filed by displacees and residents in redevelopment 
districts against developers seemed to have been gradually gaining in popularity. Ian 
Johnson, a Wall Street Journal correspondent, reported the case of two pioneering 
citizens in Beijing who made a series of failed law suits against the municipal 
government which had made huge profits from demolishing their homes in central 
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Beijing in the mid-1990s (Johnson, 2004). Recently, in Chaoyang District, a near 
suburban district next to Dongcheng District, more than one hundred households 
collectively filed a law suit against a demolition company, claiming that its certificate 
of demolition issued by the Chaoyang Bureau of Land and Resources was not 
legitimate, and that it should be cancelled in order to stop their dwellings’ forced 
demolition (Jinghua Shibao, 2004). In many of these cases, it was reported that 
residents rarely won against developers or governments (Fang, 1999). Often, the 
myriad of bureaucratic processes acted as obstacles to the residents’ petition and legal 
proceedings (Beijing Review, 2005). So was the use of implicit and explicit force that 
deterred people from resorting to judicial solutions (Human Rights Watch, 2004; 
Johnson, 2004). 
 
Refusing to vacate dwellings also seems to be a widely used strategy among residents 
facing displacement. This strategy is often employed as part of strengthening 
residents’ position by means of delaying demolition schedules and thus incurring 
greater costs on developers. In urban redevelopment projects, “a blocked regeneration 
outcome may mean no change in a locality, but that option still provides for the 
possibility of achieving an alternative preferred regeneration scenario, or of 
successfully making a political statement” (Ball, 2004: 127). In other words, unlike 
developers or local authorities, no change in their neighbourhoods can also be a viable 
option for local communities. Judging from some of the negotiation cases reported by 
the interviewees, it seemed that negotiations were not uncommon, providing even 
greater motivation for the residents to insist on staying put when their expectation 
were not met. An interviewee recollects some of her neighbours’ actions at the time of 
her neighbour’s demolition: 
 
As soon as we were told to move out, we moved out right away. Those 
people who didn’t move out received more money. They were 
formidable. They didn’t obey and made all the noise, then took the 
money… [Such people] were not few 
(69-year-old female resident, moved to a near suburban estate) 
 
Indeed, the strategy of blocking redevelopment and demolition by refusing to vacate 
their dwellings appears to be a common tactic cited by residents facing displacement. 
Anyone encountering a resident facing displacement may hear comments like “[if 
inadequate compensation is offered] we will not move out. We will just keep on living 
here” (44-year-old female interviewee). The blocking strategy has become a well-
known phenomenon in China – dingzihu, which could be literally translated as ‘nail 
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house’ or ‘nail house household’ (see for example, Yardley, 2007). Although these 
nail houses eventually become subject to forced demolition (see for example, Chen 
and Sun, 2006), they provide a powerful showcase that demonstrates residents’ protest 
against local authorities. 
 
Some of the news reports on displacees’ protests in recent years indicate that 
individual protests are on the increase. The government assessment of the number of 
protests was that “there were some 74,000 protests” in 2004, “up from 10,000 in 1994 
and 58,000 in 2003” (The Economist, 2005a). Given the exercise of censorship and 
political control, the number was likely to be underestimated. Most protests were 
isolated and contained, though occasional violent incidents alarmed the nation. For 
instance, a nation-wide shock was received in August 2003 when a man died after 
setting fire to himself in protest at his home’s forced demolition in Nanjing, Jiangsu 
Province (China Daily, 2003). His family was one of the ten out of one thousand 
families in his neighbourhood, who refused to move out. Less than a month later, 
another similar incident occurred, this time, in the heart of Beijing, the Tiananmen 
Square. A peasant set fire to himself in the morning of 15 September, suffering serious 
burns (Jiangnan Shibao, 2003). He was also protesting against his home’s forced 
demolition and poor compensation. The Ministry of Construction also revealed that 
between January and July 2002, the residents’ protests against demolition resulted in 
twenty six deaths (China Daily, 2003), clearly indicating the seriousness of violence 
and resistance to demolition. The protests and violent clashes seemed to be on the 
increase especially in rural areas where many lands were taken for urban expansion 
and the provision of infrastructure services (The Economist, 2005b). These sporadic 
cases of organized protests were found to take place across the cities, but most cases 
were eventually unsuccessful and isolated (Human Rights Watch, 2004: 26-31). To 
some extent, this was not surprising as most individual and collective actions in 
mainland China were isolated and short-lived, if not managed by the state (Beijing 
Review, 2005; Cai, 2004; Johnson, 2004). Moreover, the most problematic issue for 
the residents engaging in legal proceedings such as lawsuits and petitions was that 
even if the outcome was in the residents’ favour, legal proceedings would do little to 
stop the demolition. As a Beijing-based lawyer commented, “the house is gone 
anyway” even if the verdict turned out to support residents (China Daily, 2003). 
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5. Conclusion 
Plummer and Taylor, who examined the experimental experiences of applying 
participatory approach to China’s rural development, devises their own version of ‘a 
ladder of participation’, which is divided into six hierarchical stages (from top to 
bottom) as follows (Plummer and Taylor, 2004a: 42-44): (1) initiation or self-
management of projects by communities; (2) community participation in formal 
decision-making; (3) discussion usually in the early stage of projects; (4) expression 
of views in an organized space; (5) attendance to meetings where public agencies 
make decisions; (6) notification of activities by officials. 
 
Notification does not involve any form of direct or indirect participation, and as one 
progresses up the ladder, the degree of participation increases. In China, Plummer and 
Taylor argue that expression becomes increasingly influential, but “a more 
problematic face of this form of participation has been called confirmation, and 
describes the form of participation that occurs when project officials seek community 
confirmation of their own views…by only asking participants to become engaged in a 
narrow band of questions and issues that are closely linked to the decision that an 
external agent or government official wants to pursue” (ibid, 43). It is argued that in 
rural China, attendance “is the dominant model of participation in rural development 
initiatives implemented by government” (ibid, 43). 
 
Reflecting upon the discussions in this paper regarding local residents’ limited 
participation in redevelopment projects, there seems a long climb ahead for residents 
before reaching the top of Plummer and Taylor’s participation ladder. These 
redevelopment experiences suggest significantly constrained community participation 
in the most critical stages of project designation and design. Residents are notified of 
the imminent redevelopment project without opportunities to intervene to influence 
the local authorities’ decision. While local authorities and professional developers 
share the goal of neighbourhood transformation and the maximization of development 
gains, community participation is minimized in the midst of realizing this goal. Since 
the residents’ involvement comes only at the time of preparing for displacement and 
demolition, the intervention only concerns residents’ demands for appropriate 
relocation measures and compensation for remaining residents on compassionate 
grounds rather than with preserving their neighbourhood. The only occasion they are 
able to express their views is when they enter into negotiation to agree upon 
redevelopment compensation, but this process strongly favours developers. In short, 
community participation in neighbourhood redevelopment can be equated with their 
agreeing to evacuate in timely manner and not to delay redevelopment schedule. 
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Alarmed by a series of protests about demolition and land confiscation, the municipal 
government began to issue some supplementary regulations that provided limited 
opportunities for residents to express their views on the redevelopment of their 
neighbourhoods. One of the recent regulations includes municipal guidance in April 
2004, which stipulates that a consultation meeting should be held when more than 
forty per cent of the residents in a redevelopment neighbourhood do not come to an 
agreement over compensation with developers/demolition companies. All the parties 
concerned in a demolition process are required to attend the consultation meeting, 
including the neighbourhood committee leaders, the Street Office, and residents 
(Jinghua Shibao, 2004). These measures, however, still confine residents’ 
participation to project implementation, and do little to engage the residents from an 
early stage of redevelopment. 
 
Will the government go beyond the existing practice and adopt a more inclusive 
approach? Government officials in China are known to be driven by the pressure to 
meet social and economic targets, which form the basis of assessing their performance 
(Plummer, 2004: 7). This “target-driven approach to implement policy” (ibid.) goes 
against enhanced community participation, which often entails a great deal of time 
and resources to come to an agreement. Therefore, involving communities in possibly 
‘endless discussion’ may go against the vested interests that local authorities 
themselves have in urban redevelopment projects. They have shown a strong 
entrepreneurial taste in the way they promoted urban redevelopment strategies 
(Duckett, 1998; Shin, 2007a). 
 
If any change is to occur, this may come from the increasing pressure to involve 
homeowners, whose numbers have grown substantially in the reform era. Equipped 
with full or partial property rights that last up to seventy years under the new property 
rights regime, homeowners have shown signs of becoming a new form of interest 
group, organizing homeowners’ associations to exert their interests. It is argued that 
the vested interests of homeowners in protecting their material wealth would 
eventually lead to a growing demand to participate in neighbourhood governance and 
decision-making (Read, 2003). This leads to an ironic situation in which homeowners 
as the beneficiary of real estate development and urban redevelopment activities 
determine the fate of urban poor residents whose dwellings and neighbourhoods are 
demolished to make way for further growth of homeowners. In principle, displacees 
from redevelopment neighbourhoods may themselves join the rank of homeowners, 
but various structural constraints upon displacees and their weak socio-economic 
status suggest that urban redevelopment is more likely to serve as “an exit to the much 
constrained private rental sector” (Shin, 2007b: 181).  
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With the increasing investment of real estate capital and intense urban redevelopment, 
it is expected that urban poor’s participation will continue to be restricted and that 
local governments and developers will favour means to maintain social stability and 
prevent any community or individual resistance that may hinder redevelopment 
projects. As pointed out by a legal expert from China, the participation of urban 
residents in decision-making and rulemaking processes is still at its infancy. It is 
hampered by restrictions and manipulation by those whose vested interests conflict 
with those of ordinary citizens (Wang, X., 2003). The vested interests of local 
authorities and developers in urban redevelopment activities certainly aim to ensure 
uninterrupted pursuance of professional developers’ profit-making activities and local 
authorities’ promotion of urban restructuring and economic growth. The existing 
redevelopment policy framework suggests that the ownership of neighbourhood 
change lies with local officials and entrepreneurs. It is therefore important to open up 
discussions to seek ways in which more power can be transferred to local residents, 
allowing them to shape the future of their neighbourhoods. 
. 
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